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Reflections on Janies W. Heisig’s 
Philosophers of Nothingness
Bret W. Davis
JAMES Heisig has provided the growing worldwide community of scholars and students of the Kyoto school with a much needed and long awaited 
book. Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School1 is an im­
mensely insightful and thoroughly researched commentary on the three prin­
cipal figures of this school, Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), Tanabe
Hajime EBiZLu (1885-1962), and Nishitani Keiji B£iWn (1900-1990). Let 
me begin my reflections by disagreeing with the author’s statement that 
“there are any number of people well suited to the task” (p. ix) of writing 
such a book. Even if there are a handful of eligible scholars, there is hardly 
anyone so uniquely qualified as Heisig to take up the truly daunting “chal­
lenge of producing a general overview” of the Kyoto school, a challenge 
that—despite a steady rise in interest and the appearance of more general and 
more specialized studies—has indeed “gone unanswered both in Japan and 
abroad” (p. ix). No previous work has treated, in detail, the whole scope of 
the intertwined thought of these three philosophers; Heisig’s book brilliant­
ly manages to do this in both an introductory and critical manner.
* The writing of this article was made possible by a fellowship from the Japan Society for 
the Promotion of Science.
’ James W. Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001). Page references to this work will be given in 
parentheses in the text.
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Despite his own insistence on the possibility, and even the necessity, of 
reading the Kyoto school in translation, Heisig’s own exceptional linguistic 
abilities are no doubt a major basis for the book’s accomplishments. There 
are still few western scholars (fewer still with a background in philosophy) 
that know Japanese to the point where they can go beyond a selective read­
ing of primary texts to read widely in the secondary literature and participate 
in discussion and debate with scholars in Japan. Heisig has done just that for 
over two decades now. Moreover, together with a solid background in (west­
ern) philosophy, theology and psychology, Heisig brings to bear on his work 
a remarkable command of most of the major western languages, a dexterity 
evidenced by the fact that the book at hand was first composed in Spanish as 
Filosofos de la nada. The end product is a book that not only outlines the 
main contours of the Kyoto school, but also introduces us to the full range of 
research and debate that has taken place both in Japan and abroad. Heisig 
writes between languages, cultures and fields of speciality; he is a “transla­
tor” in the highest sense of the word in that he carries the reader from one 
world to the next, opening up borders and enabling dialogue, but never giv­
ing in to the eclectic temptation of blurring distinctions and confusing “vo­
cabularies.”
It is important to note, however, that Heisig is not merely a “translator” 
and the book is not merely an “introduction,” even in the fuller senses of 
these terms. Heisig himself is hardly content to sit and observe from the side­
lines, and he does not hold back his own insights and conclusions regarding 
the Kyoto school, nor does he pull any punches in criticizing the critics. The 
book not only deals with three thinkers, but also combines three approaches: 
interpretive summary of the primary texts, introduction to the ongoing 
debate surrounding these texts, and critical participation in this debate by the 
author himself. Not only with regard to the political controversy, but in many 
respects Heisig boldly attempts to walk a middle path between enthusiastic 
exposition and critical response. His own writing style is clear yet willing to 
follow complex ideas through to the end, subtle when necessary yet forceful 
when making a point.
A reader just approaching the Kyoto school could do no better than to use 
this book as an introduction. Those already familiar with its thought and with 
much of the debate surrounding it, will find here Heisig’s own informed 
opinion on the issues. The breadth and depth of what he has accomplished in 
the space of three hundred and fifty pages is truly amazing; it will no doubt 
be many years before another introduction of equal caliber appears. On the 
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other hand, it is precisely the success of Heisig’s combination of clear pre- 
sentation/summary and powerful interpretation/criticism that may pose a 
problem for anyone using this book as the sole source of introduction to the 
Kyoto school. Heisig is aware of the risks of his approach, and deemed 
them—correctly I think—well worth taking. He skillfully employs the dual 
structure of text and notes to help mitigate the danger of readers identifying 
his “neutral presentation” of its thought with his own interpretations and 
conclusions regarding that thought. At the end of his introductory chapter, 
Heisig writes:
As seasoned readers of the writings of the Kyoto school philoso­
phers will notice, this is as much a book of conclusions and judg­
ments as it is an introduction. While I have made no attempt to 
disguise my own interpretations, or differences from others, I do 
not wish them to distract from the broader picture I am trying to 
paint and have therefore relegated most of the debate to the notes, 
(pp.25-26)
Yet not all of Heisig’s contributions to the debate are restricted to the notes. 
As Heisig is well aware, an introduction always also introduces an interpre­
tation, and the broader a picture is painted, the more powerful become the 
lines of interpretation employed. This is a hermeneutic necessity and not a 
criticism of Heisig’s approach. Nevertheless, it is the role of the “critic” to 
direct one’s attention to the way these lines are drawn, to point out the inter­
pretive conclusions and judgments that are not, indeed could not have been 
restricted to the notes. It would seem particularly important to highlight what 
makes this work distinctive, given that many readers may be looking into the 
writings of the Kyoto school for the first time. Such readers should be aware 
of what sort of lens they are using as they do their looking. The present arti­
cle will not summarize Heisig’s summaries, so much as attempt to elucidate 
the general contours of his interpretive lens and comment on some of his 
conclusions.
Defining the Kyoto School
To begin with, there is the thorny issue of defining the “Kyoto school.” 
Heisig relates how the label first appeared in print in a partially laudatory and 
partially critical article by a student of Tanabe’s, Tosaka Jun (1900-
1945), who later became well known for his own Marxist writings. The term
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has since been used (and at times abused) to refer to the group of thinkers 
influenced by Nishida and Tanabe, a group whose membership is as contro­
versial as the general appraisal of this school. Tosaka himself is sometimes 
included as a member of its “left wing” as opposed to the “right wing,” 
which would include Koyama Iwao TiTAT; (1905-1993), Kosaka Masaaki 
iSSTESI (1900-1969) and sometimes Nishitani. In fact, although they receive 
little attention in the west, Koyama and Kosaka are nearly always included 
as members of the Kyoto school in Japan.2 Ohashi Ryosuke (1944- )
2 A recent anthology published in Japan, however, does not include either Koyama or 
Kosaka, but does include Miki Kiyoshi A A in (1897-1945) and Tosaka along with Nishida, 
Tanabe, Kimura Motomori AHSlSi (1895-1946), Hisamatsu, Shimomura, andNishitani. See 
Fujita 2001.
3 Ohashi excludes not only Tosaka, but also Miki on the grounds of their “later turn to 
Marxism.” See Ohashi 1990, p. 12.
includes them in his influential German anthology, Die Philosophie der 
Kydto-Schule, along with Nishida, Tanabe, Nishitani, Hisamatsu Shin’ichi \ 
(1889-1980), Shimomura Torataro (1902-1995), Suzuki
Shigetaka (1907-1988), and the next generation of Takeuchi
Yoshinori (1913-2002), Tsujimura Koichi (1922- ) and
Ueda Shizuteru (1926- ).3 Abe Masao PflsKEffi (1915- ) is a well-
known representative of the school in the west, but less known in Japan 
where Ueda is generally held to be its leading representative today. While the 
widest definitions of the school in Japan sometimes include other famous 
philosophers such as Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960) and Kuki Shuzo
(1888-1941), Heisig points out that it is a mistake to include D. T. 
Suzuki (1870-1966), despite his life-long friendship with and influ­
ence on Nishida.
Heisig pays due consideration to the various ways the school has been 
defined, but ultimately chooses to follow Takeuchi’s suggestion that “the 
clearest way to define the school is to ‘triangulate’ it around Nishida, 
Tanabe, and Nishitani”(p.276). “It is from these three figures,” Heisig 
writes, “that the Kyoto school radiates as a philosophical movement” (p. 5). 
While this “school” does not permit exclusive definitions of membership, he 
wisely chooses to limit the focus of his book to these three central figures, for 
it is just this balance of breadth and depth that gives his book its unique sig­
nificance. For the purposes of this article, I shall follow Heisig in using the 
term “Kyoto school” to refer primarily to these three thinkers.
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The Structure of the Book
The unique structure of Heisig’s book merits some comment. Its main text is 
composed of five chapters: an Orientation at the beginning, a Prospectus at 
the end, and one chapter each on Nishida, Tanabe and Nishitani in the 
middle. These chapters are further subdivided into a total of seventy-one sec­
tions. After nearly three hundred pages of main text, we are provided with 
approximately seventy pages of notes. Each note corresponds to a whole sec­
tion of the text, and contains not only references for all quoted passages in 
that section, but also a discussion of relevant debate in the secondary litera­
ture and more detailed comments on certain points. Grouping all this infor­
mation together, and separating it from the body of the text, allows the book 
to be read smoothly and without interruption.
I found that this structure works very well for dealing with the secondary 
literature and for keeping potentially distracting, but nevertheless highly 
interesting, details from disturbing the flow of the text. I am a bit less enthu­
siastic about the way page references for quotations are grouped all together 
at the end of the one note per section. In a conversation I had with the au­
thor—who is well known for his liberal and untiring support of fellow trans­
lators and writers—he seemed cheerfully resigned to the fact that many less 
conscientious writers would make use of the wealth of material gathered in 
the book’s pages without paying due respect to the labor and insight of the 
gatherer; but I fear that the method of citation employed may inadvertently 
make the task of tracking down a particular reference a bit cumbersome, not 
only for scavengers, but also for conscientious researchers.
As for the organizational problem of how to present this “school” through 
three independent yet mutually influencing thinkers, although Heisig treats 
them one at a time, he handles the problem of overlap in thought by giving a 
common idea fuller exposition in one of the chapters and only abbreviated 
attention in the others. “The result is that, contrary to appearances, none of 
the chapters stands independently on its own, but each relies to some extent 
on the others” (p. 24).
A further noteworthy aspect of Heisig’s method of presentation is his 
decision not to always follow a strictly chronological order of presentation, 
explicating ideas rather only “more or less in the order in which they ap­
peared,” and indeed “freely using later writings to interpret earlier ones 
without always drawing attention to the fact” (p. 24). This is, in fact, a bold 
interpretive decision, and one that goes against the grain of much of the 
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chronological step by step research carried out in Japan, and to a lesser extent 
in the west. In this regard, Heisig writes:
I have avoided the customary carving of the careers of Nishida and 
Tanabe into stages because I felt it more important to concentrate 
on recurrent themes as far as I could. In the case of Nishitani ... to 
impose a structure on a thinking as organic as [his] was . . . risks 
obscuring what is most distinctive about it. . . . With the exception 
of his excursus into political ideology, we can describe these 
motifs with a minimum of attention to their dating or locating them 
in the development of his ideas, (p. 190)
The political writings certainly deserve careful dating, and Heisig is clear 
about chronological matters in this regard. I concur that the only major shift 
in Nishitani’s thinking took place with regard to his turn to, and then away 
from, politicizing his critique of modernity.4 In the end, I think Heisig’s 
method works best with Nishitani and least well with Nishida, where the cus­
tomary treatment of the latter’s thought in developmental stages may be 
more justifiable than Heisig gives it credit. I will return to this issue at the 
end of this article.
4 See Davis 2003.
Presenting the Kyoto School as World Philosophy
Let us turn now to the basic thesis of the book, namely, that the Kyoto school 
deserves to be read not merely as a bygone moment in the history of Japanese 
ideas, but as a major and still contemporary contribution to “world philoso­
phy.” Heisig argues that, despite the fact that “no one has tried to place the 
Kyoto philosophers in the history of philosophy as a whole” (p. 279), “this 
group of philosophers represents] Japan’s first sustained and original con­
tribution to western philosophical thought” (p. 3). They have “given us a 
world philosophy, one that belongs as rightfully to the inheritance as much 
as the western philosophies with which they wrestled and from which they 
drew their inspiration” (p. 9). They also, of course, drew inspiration from 
eastern and particularly Buddhist sources, and this is precisely what has 
allowed them to “break the mold” of assuming that “world philosophy” in 
the “strict sense” has been and can be only done in the west and according to 
the western model. One may want to question Heisig’s assertion that the 
tradition of western philosophy “in the strict sense of the term has never 
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been broken, spliced, enlarged, or seriously challenged by Asian thought” 
(p. 8)—for did not Schopenhauer’s “appropriation of eastern ideas into 
western philosophy” (p. 260) leave its mark on the nineteenth century, and 
have not modem Indian thinkers such as Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan also 
challenged the strictly western contours of philosophy? Nevertheless, 
Heisig’s argument that the Kyoto school provides us with a highly signifi­
cant, and in many respects, unique contribution to “world philosophy” 
stands.
While forcefully making this argument, Heisig is at the same time careful 
to keep in question both terms of this locution: “world” and “philosophy.” 
What does the adjective “world” mean here? Heisig is certainly no trumpet 
blower at an inauguration parade for the “global village,” an idea he round­
ly criticizes elsewhere by way of Tanabe’s logic of the specific.5 If there is a 
“one world” in the making, it needs to be built one step at a time, and should 
not have as its goal the inevitably imperialistic abolishment of differences. 
One of the most important achievements of the Kyoto school is the effect its 
thought has had on pluralizing the dialogue of “world philosophy.” Heisig 
writes in the concluding paragraph of his book:
5 Heisig 1995, pp. 198-224.
If we are poised at the brink of a new age of world philosophy, one 
in which the confluence of east and west will take up the task of 
redefining one another without either reducing the other to one of 
the available common denominators, the thought of Nishida, 
Tanabe, and [Nishitani] may help push the weak in spirit to take 
the next step. (p. 272)
The adjective “world,” then, does not signify an annihilation of the specific, 
but rather designates the dialogical space in which one can recognize the 
unique contributions of different traditions to an intercultural conversation of 
philosophy.
The term “philosophy” is, of course, no less tricky here, given its seman­
tic roots in the western tradition. The task is to see just how far one can ex­
pose “(western) philosophy” to its often still unacknowledged cultural roots, 
that is, to its residues of a parochialism dressed up as a universalism while at 
the same time acknowledging and carrying forth its own traditional contri­
butions, which include that of a strong “tradition” of rational, dialogical dis­
course and radical self-critique. The Kyoto school thinkers, Heisig writes, 
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were aware that “philosophy” would always include at least western philos­
ophy, and they accordingly assumed responsibility for understanding the 
past and present of that tradition. “Their contribution would have to be not at 
the expense of everything philosophy has been, but at its enhancement” (p. 
8). Their own “Japanese philosophy,” decisively inspired though it was by 
eastern sources, was nevertheless aimed outward. If, for the sake of original 
and authentic thinking, they found it necessary to return to their roots and to 
the wellsprings of eastern thought, this was not a retreat from the world that 
the west had—forcefully and peacefully—opened up, but for the sake of 
enhancing the worldliness of this world. “Let there be no mistake,” Heisig 
writes, “the Kyoto philosophers are eastern and they are Buddhist. But their 
aim and context is neither eastern nor Buddhist” (p. 8). Far from “simply 
reupholstering traditional philosophical questions in an oriental decor,” the 
Kyoto school presents us with “a disciplined and well-informed challenge to 
the definition of the history of philosophy itself” (p. 3), a challenge that not 
only provides new answers to old questions but also attempts “a reframing of 
the questions from a standpoint all their own” (p. 24).
Moreover, Heisig argues, the Kyoto school’s efforts to bring the west out 
of its unrecognized parochialism was simultaneously an attempt to open 
Japan up to the wider world. Despite their own temporary excesses and aber­
rations with regard to culture and political theory, their dual aim was that of 
“an introduction of Japanese philosophy into world philosophy while at the 
same time using western philosophy for a second look at Japanese thought 
trapped in fascination with its own uniqueness” (p. 270). They fought a bat­
tle on two fronts, as it were, in order to bring Japan into the world and the 
world into Japan. Their battle on the home front was also a call for the west 
to finally enter into dialogue with the world it had yet only sought to conquer 
in the name of empire, capital or spirit.
Heisig’s book succeeds not only in introducing the Kyoto school as a 
major contribution to world philosophy; he also convincingly reveals how its 
contribution remains a major impetus and resource for actualizing the still 
tenuous possibility of genuine world philosophy as a multi-traditional dia­
logue.
Political Thought as Aberration
The great irony, which continues to threaten the development of the Kyoto 
school and its reception and transplantation abroad, is the fact that this first 
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Japanese attempt to contribute to (the birth of) world philosophy took place 
at a time when Japan was shutting its doors once again to the world, and this 
time threatening to take a collection of Asian colonies back in with it. This 
was a turbulent time, a time where “ideas that had once been right were left, 
and left right. National and ethnic identity, the rejection of wholesale west­
ern-style democracy and culture, the recovery of Asian roots, and so forth, 
were all usurped by a scrappy set of ideas that advertised itself as a philoso­
phy of ‘the imperial way’ ” (p. 5). The Kyoto school thinkers unfortunately 
did get caught up in this whirlpool, and their attempts failed at changing its 
direction or, at least, keeping it from spinning out of control. During this time 
of “all-out war,” all three of these thinkers developed and applied their 
thinking in ways that we cannot endorse today, and there are many passages 
and several texts that simply defy attempts at interpretive rescue.
In many ways, the tides have changed and changed again since the end of 
the war, with the academic world of the past several decades often showing 
a willingness to question the “cultural imperialism” of western values and 
traditions, and to ask how these are sometimes reflected in the very logic of 
our thinking. This has made possible a resurgence of interest in these 
Japanese philosophers, and “the respectable connotation that the name 
‘Kyoto school’ enjoys in the west has more or less rubbed off on Japan as 
well” (p. 7). There are signs, however, of yet another twist. Just as the Kyoto 
school has begun to regain its audience at home, certain western critics, 
reacting to a lacuna in the first wave of interest there, have begun overem­
phasizing the political misadventures of the school’s members while seeking 
to characterize it as merely a reactionary encounter with modernity. All too 
often the debate over the politics of the school takes place in a viscious cir­
cle. Attackers—often taking lines and texts out of context—accuse the 
Kyoto school of being nothing but ideologues of fascism, while the defend­
ers refuse to acknowledge—and self-critically work through—any element 
of political misjudgment.
Heisig has done more than just about any other scholar, either in Japan or 
abroad, to break this deadlock. To begin with, he helped bring all but the 
most strident ideological attackers to the discussion table for a landmark 
conference in the mid-1990s, which resulted in a volume that he edited to­
gether with John Maraldo (another remarkable scholar in this regard).6 In 
Philosophers of Nothingness, Heisig once again attempts to “strike a bal­
6 Heisig and Maraldo 1994.
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ance” (p. 6) on this issue, and he succeeds in clearing a middle path between 
what he aptly names elsewhere the competing camps of “side-swipers and 
side-steppers.”7 On the one hand, he does not flinch from the task of quoting 
and critically commenting on the most condemning passages from the polit­
ical writings of the Kyoto school in the 1930s and 1940s. On the other hand, 
he persuasively argues that such passages and texts represent aberrations 
from the core of its philosophies. He states his conclusion up front and in no 
uncertain terms:
7 Heisig 1990, p. 14.
8 Elsewhere Heisig concludes on this subject: “Tanabe’s political conclusions are in no 
sense a natural outflowing of the logic of the specific; they are a refusal by its author to take 
the idea as seriously as it deserved.” in Heisig and Maraldo 1994, p. 288.
One has, deliberately or otherwise, to ignore the greatest bulk of 
the writings of these thinkers to arrive at the conclusion that 
anything approaching or supporting the imperialistic ideology of 
wartime Japan belongs to the fundamental inspiration of their 
thought. Insofar as any of them did willingly add support, it may be 
considered an aberration from their own intellectual goals, (p. 6)
As an example of such aberration, Heisig shows how Tanabe failed to apply 
the insights of his “logic of the specific” to his own concrete historical situ­
ation. When Tanabe takes the unnecessary—“if not outright inconsistent 
with the principles of his own logic”—step of raising the “relative absolute” 
of his own nation above others, it “is as if Tanabe were quoting himself out 
of context” (pp. 136-137).8
In general, I agree with Heisig’s judgment that the overtly political writ­
ings of the Kyoto school are best read as aberrations from the fundamental 
inspirations of its thought. The gray area that requires further attention is its 
more general works on culture and intercultural relations; for there is much 
to be salvaged there—not only for the sake of squaring it with our views 
today on such issues, but as challenges to problems and presumptions that 
have not gone away in the last half a century—even if there are also many 
slippery slopes back down into the problematic political theory that need to 
be carefully uncovered and criticized. Heisig himself, at the end of the book, 
suggests that one area for further research is that of the “vast web of connec­
tions between their thinking and the historical changes of the day” (p. 263). 
But even if some of its ideas can be fruitfully read as “metaphors of the 
ambiguities that marked Japan’s entry into the modem world” (p. 262), the 
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Kyoto school can no more be reduced to “a product of its time” than it can 
be wholly abstracted from its historical context. We ourselves still have 
much to reflect on by way of its texts with regard to our own changing 
historical context, and in regard to that which has not changed—as well as 
that which perhaps does not change—in the relations between cultures.
An Insistence on Translatability
Given the fact that the rehabilitation of the reputation of the Kyoto school in 
Japan occurred during a time of general reaffirmation of “Japaneseness” in 
the face of an increasingly westernized world, Heisig’s insistence on the 
translatability of the writings of the Kyoto school marks an important thesis 
of his book. There is a tendency of some Japanese commentators to overly 
stress the uniquely Japanese aspects of its thought and language, and hence 
to assert, or at least imply, an inherent untranslatability—particularly into 
western languages, which are taken to be rigorously structured according to 
a grammatical subject/object split (see pp. 300- 301). Heisig calls into ques­
tion this alleged “linguistic incompatibility,” and indeed argues that “for the 
goal of the Kyoto philosophers—a grafting of Japanese thought on world 
philosophy—to be fulfilled, they must be read in translation (not only in the 
original)” (p. 20).
A passage from the chapter on Nishida persuasively makes this point:
His novelty had to be philosophical and at the same time non-west- 
em. . . . Only then could he expose world philosophy to the hy­
pocrisy of universal aspirations carved in the stone of parochial 
biases. . . . Those of his Japanese readers who gloat over his neol­
ogisms as having no equivalent in western philosophy and not 
even any possible translation, which makes them only really intel­
ligible to those who share Nishida’s culture and linguistic back­
ground, not only miss the point of his goal, but [they] push his 
ideas in the opposite direction he was headed. . . . The distinctive­
ness of the Japanese is only a local value; it is enhanced when its 
core can be extracted and translated into something of world 
scope, (pp. 37-38)
Heisig’s affirmation of the translatability of the Kyoto school is best under­
stood, I think, as a counter-argument against those who would construct, out 
of their linguistic particularity, a tool for the assertion of what has been 
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called “the myth of Japanese uniqueness.” The Kyoto school philosophers 
themselves were certainly far from simple ideologues of Japanism, and the 
language of their text was often as much, if not more, influenced by their 
own translations of western philosophy as by the grammar and literature of 
their native tongue. As an antidote to the “fantasy of linguistic incompatibil­
ity” (p. 281), Heisig is certainly right to “deflate the idea that reading them 
in translation is the major disadvantage that it is often made out to be in 
philosophical circles,” and even to provocatively assert that “their writings 
are almost more accessible to the western philosophical reader in translation 
than they are to the average Japanese reader in the original” (p. 18).
On the other hand, although Nishida was, to be sure, “a world philosopher 
precisely because he believed he could understand the west, and the west 
him” (p. 88), the hermeneutic endeavor still needs to proceed in both direc­
tions. This means that it is as important for westerners to learn Japanese as it 
was for the Kyoto philosophers to learn western languages. It is true that 
Nishida’s prose is far from “typical Japanese,” and that he was “forging a 
new language” (p. 19) that was highly influenced by translation of western 
philosophical idioms; but precisely in order to sort these matters out, there 
must be those who are acquainted with both linguistic bases. Nishida himself 
refers to his topology as a “logic of the east,” and there has, in fact, been 
some interesting work done on the relation of his thought to the grammar of 
the Japanese language.9 One can no more abstract Nishida wholly from his 
cultural and linguistic background than one can wholly reduce him to it. 
Nishida can and should be read in translation. But we need also to continue 
to correct the imbalance—an imbalance that Heisig too laments—that has 
existed between non-westemers who learn western languages and western­
ers who remain for the most part comfortably within their own linguistic 
horizons.
9 See the following works that suggestively relate Nishida’s logic of locus to “Tokieda 
grammar” which diagrams the Japanese sentence using concentric circles of enveloping 
words: Nakamura 1983, pp. 94—102 and Fujita 1997, pp. 36-54.
10 “Not just occasionally but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author. . . . [We] 
understand in a different way, if we understand at all.” Gadamer 1994, pp. 296-297.
It is indeed not a fact to be regretted that—as Gadamer puts it—under­
standing is always understanding differently.10 The philosophies of the 
Kyoto school have already begun their journey of “productive translation” 
into the discourses of the west, just as western philosophy continues to be 
productively translated into Japanese. Yet this project of creative interpreta­
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tion needs always to be complemented by careful attempts to understand the 
Kyoto school texts, as far as is possible, “in their own terms,” and this 
involves tracing the emergence of their thought out of their own cultural 
context and language. Both of these directions of research are necessary, on 
the one hand to welcome these Japanese philosophers into the dialogue of 
world philosophy, and on the other hand to pluralize this dialogue by intro­
ducing essential elements of their culture and language along with their 
thought. It is no more necessary to strip them wholly of their Japaneseness 
than it is for us to wholly become Japanese in order to understand them. Both 
extremes—neither of which is in the end possible—are inimical to the con­
struction of world philosophy as a dialogue between interconnecting worlds.
Against Abstractions of East and West
I think Heisig would basically agree that both of these complementary direc­
tions of research should be promoted. He strongly resists, however, the idea 
that Nishida’s “logic of the east” cannot be expressed by western languages, 
and protests that such conclusions are reached only by overly abstracting and 
rigidifying western thought and language. All too often, Heisig complains, 
the living culture and language of Japan, in all its richness and flexibility, 
gets compared to a formal and selective understanding of the west. More­
over, he argues, this tendency is found not only among later generations of 
Japanese commentators, but can be traced back to the Kyoto school thinkers 
themselves, who tended to “approach western thinking as a whole” (p. 13). 
Heisig critically remarks:
The west of which they write is a highly selective one, centered on 
intellectual history, and within intellectual history on philosophy, 
and within philosophy on the Continental philosophy from Des­
cartes to Heidegger. The art and literature that has been important 
in that history also figure in their writing, though to a greatly 
diminished extent. But the living culture of the west within which 
that history took shape is absent. And more than absent, it is as­
sumed—usually without adequate reason—to be radically differ­
ent from the living culture of Japan, (p. 271)
Furthermore, according to Heisig, this abstraction of “the west” is often con­
founded by an equally abstract and restrictive self-understanding of “the 
east.” “At best,” he writes, “the east” that these thinkers often write in the
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name of, is “one constellation of a heritage too long and too plural to be rep­
resented fairly by Japan” (p. 271). Despite the rather severe tone of this crit­
icism, however, he does not lump the Kyoto school together with the likes of 
Okakura Tenshin (1862-1913), who, after famously proclaiming
that “Asia is one,” goes on to assert that it has been “the great privilege of 
Japan to realize this unity-in-complexity with a special clearness,” for Japan 
alone is “the real repository of the trust of Asiatic thought and culture.”11 
While critical of Nishida’s excessive abstractions of “western being” and 
“eastern nothingness,” Heisig resists those who read his theory of culture as 
anything like an unabashed Japanism or as merely an ideological foreground 
for his political misadventures (see p. 87).
II Okakura 2000, pp. 1 and 5.
12 Nietzsche 1996, aph. no. 616. Cf. Scheiffele 1991, pp. 31-47.
“The east” of which the Kyoto school philosophers speak in their better 
moments, is perhaps not to be wholly sacrificed to the museum of outdated 
ideologies, even though it is certainly not to be handed over to those who 
would use it to reify cultural polarities. Indeed, Heisig himself freely makes 
use of this term when he affirms that the primary inspiration of the Kyoto 
school is something “eastern and . . . Buddhist” (p. 8) and concludes that 
these thinkers “give the west a way into the east like none other” (p. 272). 
The qualified usefulness of the terms “east” and “west” may thus survive, 
even if one must always attend to the danger of ideological abstraction.
I would also add that it is, at times, precisely the boldness of some of the 
Kyoto school’s “abstractions” which opens up interesting questions. I 
myself must confess to experiences of both frustration and illumination in 
looking back at “the west” through the vantage point of its distance. As 
Nietzsche writes concerning the hermeneutic advantage an ocean of differ­
ence can provide: “Looking back at the coast from this distance, we com­
mand a view, no doubt for the first time, of its total configuration.”II 12 
Abstractions conceal, yes, but let us not forget what they can sometimes 
reveal. What is after all comparative thinking—if not indeed thinking as 
such—other than a dynamic between, on the one hand, venturing conceptual 
generalities and distinctions, and on the other hand, critically dismantling 
those structures that conceal more than they reveal and shaving off the 
excesses of those which can be allowed to stand for a while? While many of 
their broad brushstrokes need to be filled in today with more accurate and 
fewer polarizing details, the critical boldness of the Kyoto school did man­
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age to clear a field of comparative inquiry like no other group of thinkers in 
modem Japanese intellectual history, and in many ways like no other group 
anywhere in the post-Kipling history of the encounter between east and west.
The Provocative Problem of “Religious Philosophy”
One crucial difference that Heisig incisively points out between the Bud­
dhism-inspired philosophies of the Kyoto school and the western intellectual 
tradition, concerns the relation of “philosophy” to “religion.” He explains 
that underlying the philosophies of Nishida, Tanabe and Nishitani, “there is 
an important assumption that is not shared with western philosophy as a 
whole: the clear delineation between philosophy and religion” (pp. 13-14). 
Hence, one of the things that the Kyoto school discloses about the modem 
west is the particularity of the latter’s assumption of an irreconcilable oppo­
sition between these domains.
For readers with a background in western philosophy, it is indeed the case 
that one inevitably finds oneself asking “at some point whether these 
thinkers have not in fact forsaken philosophy for religion” (p. 269). Heisig 
sharply anticipates the blunt criticism that the Kyoto school, at times, seems 
to want to have “the best of both worlds—to claim that it is being religious­
ly Buddhist when a philosophical criticism hits close to the core, and that it 
is being philosophically western when a serious objection arises from the 
Buddhist side” (p. 17). Without simply denying the impact of this criticism, 
he argues that not only is this objection “the inevitable risk that comes from 
straddling two worlds the way they do” (p. 17), but that the question of 
whether it has forsaken philosophy for religion “cannot be answered as such, 
but only deflected, because it hides a fundamental confusion of categories” 
(p. 269). This confusion is founded on assuming the universality of the mod­
em western either/or dyad of “philosophy-versus-religion.”
Heisig quotes Takeuchi Yoshinori as writing that “philosophy has served 
Buddhism as an inner principle of religion, and not as an outside critique.” 
Moreover, the “religion” that “philosophy” supports here, is not one based 
on a faithful submission to the irrationalities of revelation. There is no “folly 
of the cross” in Buddhism, but rather—especially in Zen—an experiential 
orientation to “awakening” that involves an exertion of “one’s whole body 
and mind” (^>^#).
There is, in fact, a “productive ambivalence” in the very term 
with which the Kyoto school thinkers often characterize their thought, a term 
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which can mean either “philosophy of religion” or “religious philosophy.” 
This ambivalence is of course not lost on Nishitani, for example, whose 
thought moves in the space opened up by a mutual supplement/critique be­
tween what might be called a “phenomenology of Zen experience” on the 
one hand, and “rational inquiry” on the other. However, this mediation is 
made possible largely by being able to draw on a tradition unencumbered by 
the presupposition of an unbridgeable chasm of faith versus reason.
In order to understand the “religious philosophy” of Nishida, Tanabe and 
Nishitani, it is necessary to rethink these terms from the perspective of their 
own cultural context. While this context is, of course, also one of dialogue 
with the western tradition from which the very terms LA’ and AS are adopt­
ed as translations of “philosophy” and “religion” (an adoption which does 
indeed partially legitimate the critical question with regard to their alleged 
“conflation”), Heisig stresses that “the primary frame of reference for the 
coincidence of philosophy and religion [for these three thinkers] is always 
Buddhist, and more specifically a Buddhism focused on the pursuit of self- 
awareness” (p. 270).
While he notes that the “Kyoto philosophers regularly draw on Zen, Pure 
Land, Kegon, and Tendai Buddhist ideas to explain their reinterpretation of 
certain fundamental philosophical concepts,” he confesses what he calls a 
“glaring omission” in his book, namely, that “in order to keep the book with­
in the confines of traditional philosophical thought”13, it was necessary to 
have “eliminated nearly all excursions into Buddhist thought” (p. 25). Heisig 
should certainly be excused for having kept the book focused on the texts of 
the Kyoto school and its critics, not only for the sake of page limits and clar­
ity, but also because its thought is meant to be able to stand on its own. 
Nevertheless, I agree that one important area for future research on the Kyoto 
school—one that has been neglected even, or particularly, in Japan where the 
“philosophers” who take up its thought are primarily trained in western phi­
losophy, and where “very little attention has been given to the Kyoto school 
by scholars devoted to the classical thought and texts of the east” (p. 260)— 
is indeed that of clarifying the relation of its thought to the eastern traditions 
on which it draws for so many of its fundamental intuitions. As Heisig 
remarks, this is easier done with regard to Nishitani, who himself makes 
these connections explicit, and most difficult with regard to Nishida, whose
13 One might wonder at this wording, for was not the Kyoto school to have splintered and 
enlarged these “confines of traditional [western] philosophical thought”?
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allusions to eastern thought, while occurring at decisive points in his texts, 
pale in comparison to his explicit references to western philosophers.14
14 It is noteworthy in this regard that the collection of Nishida’s books that is kept in the 
library at Kyoto University consists almost exclusively of western works and those on west­
ern philosophy. (Nishida’s sizable collection of classical Chinese and Japanese texts is kept at 
a distance in his hometown of Unoke ^7 M.) In comparison, and in correction of the num­
bers Heisig cites (see p.187), Nishitani’s personal library (which is scheduled to be made 
available at Otani University) is said to contain approximately 4,000 western titles, 7,000 
books in Japanese, and an additional 500 sewn Japanese volumes (^S^k). Cf. Hase 2002, p. 
13.
The Fundamental Orientation of the Kyoto School: Self-Awareness
Heisig understands the primary philosophical/religious inspiration of the 
Kyoto school to be “a Buddhism focused on the pursuit of self-awareness” 
(p. 270). It is not surprising, then, that the idea “self-awareness” becomes the 
focus for much of his discussion; in the index of the book, we find no fewer 
than seventy-eight page references for the term. Although he appropriately 
decides to treat this idea most fully in the chapter on Nishida, he also in­
cludes a lengthy section entitled “Self and Self-Awareness” in the chapter on 
Tanabe (see pp. 165-171), where it is argued that the concept is central to 
Tanabe’s thought as well. While noting how Tanabe and Nishitani develop 
this idea of Nishida’s in their own somewhat independent manner, Heisig 
maintains that an orientation to self-awareness, together with a handful of 
other related key ideas such as “absolute nothingness” and “the self that is 
not a self,” unifies the thought of the Kyoto school. In general, the notion of 
“self-awareness” is at the center of both Heisig’s lucid interpretation and his 
sharpest criticism of the philosophy of the Kyoto school.
His own critical stance carries forward a line of critique that might be 
traced back, interestingly enough, to the early Tanabe himself, and which 
clearly appears in Tosaka’s article that introduced the label “Kyoto school.” 
The first mention of the term “self-awareness” in Philosophers of Nothing­
ness occurs in the context of explaining Tosaka’s complaint that “Nishida 
had sacrificed historical consciousness to his preoccupation with the interi- 
ority of self-awareness” (p. 4). Heisig’s own chief concern involves what he 
sees as a loss of ethical attention to the otherness of the interpersonal you, but 
this too is a complaint against the self-orientation of self-awareness. Does 
the self-awareness of which these thinkers speak preclude a genuine other- 
awareness, that is to say, an awareness of the radical otherness of the other, 
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an ethical “response-ability” to the other of whom one can never be fully 
aware?
Heisig certainly does not rashly impose this line of criticism from the start 
on his elucidation of the notion of self-awareness. He is careful in many 
respects to point out certain pitfalls of misunderstanding and to develop the 
rich nuances of the idea. When Nishida places the dialectical event of self- 
awareness at the focal point of reality, this must not be simply understood as 
an idealistic subsumption of the world into the subjective ego. For Nishida, 
we recall, it is not that there is a self who has experience, but rather that there 
is experience in which appears a self (and an ‘other’). Thus, as Heisig notes, 
“Nishida had long thought there was something amiss with the preoccupa­
tion with the ‘ego’ in modem western philosophy, but at the same time he 
needed some way to talk about reflexive consciousness. The term ‘aware­
ness’ filled this need” (p. 50). Nishida, attempting to root out any vestiges of 
psychologism that remained in his early writings, later tended to avoid the 
term “self-consciousness” to depict this event. “Whereas self-consciousness 
points to a field in which the reality is grasped by an individual self, self- 
awareness points to a field in which reality becomes aware of itself in the 
individual self” (p. 51). (According to Nishida’s later writings, I would add, 
the self experiences itself as a “focal point” of the self-determination of 
absolute nothingness, that is, as an individual that is itself self-determining, 
but also always in a relation of mutual determination with other individuals.)
Although Heisig suggests that the term g could often be well translated 
simply as “awareness,” he also gives us an interesting double interpretation 
of the term by referring to two ways of understanding the ‘self’ of “self- 
awareness,” the g of g%. On the one hand, it refers to the “true Self” of 
which one becomes aware, the self that transcends the self-enclosed ego by 
negating itself. On the other hand, the character signifies that something is 
not controlled or effected from the outside but rather occurs of itself, natu­
rally. On the one hand, then, self-awareness “was a person’s awareness of 
one’s innermost nature; and on the other hand, it was an awareness that was 
not so much accomplished by the person but allowed to take place sponta­
neously, of itself, and without interference. In other words, awareness in 
Nishida came to carry the combined sense of an auto-awareness of the self 
(p. 50).
What then is this “self” that becomes aware? The importance of “the 
‘self’ question” in the philosophies of the Kyoto school is reflected in the 
fact that besides the term “self-awareness,” there are no fewer than thirty- 
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nine other terms listed in Heisig’s index that begin with “self-”! This 
apparent self-obsession might seem ironic given the fact that the Buddhism- 
inspired point of their philosophies is to negate the ego and return to the 
no-self, the non-ego or non-I (three more terms listed in the index). 
However, one must also recall that the path of Buddhist practice is one of, to 
paraphrase Dogen, studying the self in order to forget the self and be enlight­
ened by the ten-thousand things of the world. Self-obsession is the pre-exist­
ing problem to be dealt with, not the point of their philosophies—that point 
being rather a conversion from the self-enclosed ego to what Nishitani refers 
to in his early writings, as the “elemental subjectivity” of one who has 
“become aware of the bottom dropping out” (KJg-O 1 %) from any attempt to 
ground or substantialize the self, and later on calls “the self that is not a self” 
(1 cVT u § A). The self-aware self is thus the self that has broken through 
the walls of its individual ego to non-dualistically identify itself with (the 
concerns of) others.
Nevertheless, despite the best efforts of all manner of philosophers, the 
problem of egoism often remains deceptively multilayered and intractable. 
Furthermore, the notion of a transpersonal “higher Self” often sublimates 
and disguises the problem more than helping to resolve it. The contemporary 
radical critiques of idealism—with their insistence on the non-sublatable 
“otherness of the Other”—have attuned us to the many subtle manifestations 
of this problem. Is the philosophy of “self-awareness,” in the end, another 
version of subjective idealism with its forgetfulness of radical otherness? Is 
the Kyoto school yet another example of where, as Levinas puts it: “Philos­
ophy is an egology”?15
15 Levinas would presumably call into question not only the “true Self” of self-awareness, 
but also what Heisig calls its “spontaneity.” Levinas writes in this regard: “The strangeness of 
the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accom­
plished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics.” The crucial question from the 
standpoint of Levinas’ thought is whether or not Nishida’s logic of “the locus of absolute 
nothingness” ultimately manages to become something essentially different from “ontology” 
defined as: “a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term 
that ensures the comprehension of being.” Levinas 1969, pp. 43-44.
Questioning the Place of the Other in a Philosophy of Self-Awareness
At the end of his book, Heisig raises the question of “the relation of self- 
awareness to the critique of the anthropocentric view of reality” (p. 265), a 
question that once again suggests a problematic affinity between the phi­
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losophies of the Kyoto school and subjective idealism. On the one hand, he 
notes that “[Nishida’s] logic of locus, [Tanabe’s] logic of the specific, and 
[Nishitani’s] standpoint of emptiness all stand or fall on [their] critique of 
tailoring the real to suit the purposes of subject-centered consciousness” (p. 
265). The dynamic of self-awareness culminates in a breakthrough beyond 
being and beyond any subjectivity that reduces objects and other persons to 
representations of its own conscious designs. This would hardly seem to be 
an easy target for contemporary critiques of subjectivity; indeed one might 
expect a fruitful dialogue here.
On the other hand, Heisig questions the extent to which these philosophies 
of “self-awareness” can, in the last analysis, escape the criticisms levied 
against idealistic philosophies which center reality on—or even reduce it 
to—“subjective consciousness.” With regard to the suspicion of anthro­
pocentrism, he remarks how “again and again it has been noted in these 
pages how the idea of a self-awareness without a subject was made to func­
tion as a paradigm for the structure of reality itself” (p. 265). Insofar as this 
structuring thesis is “not directly questioned, let alone justified,” Heisig con­
tends, “much of the anthropomorphism that is thrown out the front door 
returns creeping in through the back” (p. 266). Although in this passage he is 
reacting to the marginalization of animals and other non-human beings, in 
several places throughout the book he directs his concern to the status of 
other persons. The place of the interpersonal other in these philosophies of 
self-awareness is the site of Heisig’s sharpest criticism. This issue may very 
well also prove to be one of the most controversial aspects of his interpreta­
tion. I will attempt here only to note his critique and raise a few counter­
questions.
In his presentation of Nishitani’s reflections on the self-other relation, 
Heisig quotes one of Nishitani’s programmatic, if perhaps somewhat enig­
matic, characterizations of the logic of authentic encounter: “Within the 
absolute two, one and the same absolute openness dominates. Absolute dis­
crimination is here the same as absolute equality. . . . Thus absolute opposi­
tion is at the same time absolute harmony. . . . Self and other are not one, and 
not two. To be not one and not two means that they are related, with each 
retaining its absoluteness, and while still being relative are never for a 
moment separated” (p. 234). It is when the ego that insists on its own auton­
omy is broken through, Heisig elaborates, that genuine love is possible, 
namely “love as a non-ego in which the other is ‘present’ as other and not 
simply as a ‘projection of one’s own ego’” (p. 234).
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And yet, despite this positive elucidation of Nishitani’s attempt to think 
the relation of self and other in such a way that neither is alienated from or 
reduced to the other, Heisig has already somewhat preemptively concluded 
that: “As with Nishida, the I-you relationship in Nishitani is given a place of 
special importance but does not form part of the paradigm of all of reality. In 
a word, interpersonal encounter is made the handmaiden of self-awareness, 
and within it the ‘other’ is viewed as a dimension of no-self” (p. 233). Else­
where Heisig writes that “the concept of the no-self functions as a metaphor 
for the pursuit of a state of complete awareness” (p. 16); thus he sees the rela­
tion to the other as ultimately being subordinated to the self’s coming to 
awareness of itself. Looking back at the section of the Nishida chapter enti­
tled “Self and Other,” we find that Heisig lays precisely this critical judg­
ment forth in no uncertain terms:
The initial impression that the I-you relationship looks to be no 
more than a secondary, derivative function of self-reflection on the 
field of absolute nothingness, is confirmed again and again. The 
encounter of an I with a you is simply one instance of the I en route 
to its own negation in self-awareness of nothingness. . . . [The] self 
sees an absolute other [in the depths of its self], but this other is not 
a you but only the self itself recognized through the you. What 
unites seer and seen, what determines without anything doing the 
determining is the universal of nothingness in which all personali­
ty, and therefore also all personal encounter, has been abolished, 
(p. 83)
And yet, one familiar with the often paradoxical logic of the Kyoto school 
writings might be tempted to add here a “death/resurrection” (?EiM?S) twist 
to the last line, making it read: “. . . the universal of nothingness in which all 
personality, and therefore also all personal encounter, has been abolished— 
and at the same time first made truly possible."' This is, in fact, precisely how 
Ueda Shizuteru interprets and develops Nishida’s thought. Ueda uses the 
greeting of the bow as a concrete example to illustrate how mutual self-nega- 
tion—the emptying of all ego-centered presumptions and agendas—returns 
us to the locus of absolute nothingness, a communal place where, to borrow 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s paradoxical manner of expression, we share nothing in 
common. It is only by “bowing” down into and rising back up within this 
open field of nothingness that a genuine personal encounter can take place. 
“There, by way of making oneself into a nothingness, one returns into the 
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infinite depths of that ‘between’ where there is neither an I nor a you. . . . 
Then, when we rise again so as to come back to life anew and face one anoth­
er, this becomes a matter of, as Dogen puts it: ‘thus am I, thus are you
Heisig appears to read this complementary death/resurrection of personal­
ity rather as an encroachment on the inherently asymmetrical ethical relation 
of the self to the other. The “moral imperative” which he finds clearly pre­
served in Buber’s I-thou relation is said to be absent in Nishida.16 7 What 
remains is said to be something similar to Kierkegaard’s process of self-con­
stitution, “where the I-you relationship is a stage in the ‘self’s relating itself 
to itself’” (pp. 301-302).18 This is a severe criticism, and one that cannot be 
easily rebuked. Yet, I do not think it should be the last word on the issue. 
Indeed, despite the fact that the claim that “all personal encounter has been 
abolished” somewhat dramatically ends the “Self and Other” section of the 
book, the issue is further problematized by Heisig himself, in the following 
section, entitled “Love and Responsibility.” There, he quotes Nishida as 
writing that the “direct intuition” of an I knowing a you or a you knowing an 
I is a matter of “recognizing oneself as harboring in the recesses of inferior­
ity an absolute other and turning to that other to see it as an absolute other, 
not to unite with it” (p. 84). Might we not read Nishida as saying here that the 
other in the depths of the self breaks, rather than completes, the hegemony of 
the subject—that it opens one up to, rather than subsumes the otherness of 
the other? This direction of interpretation is supported by the fact that 
Nishida writes of “an ‘infinite responsibility’ of a historically situated I 
toward a historical you,” and that there “is no responsibility as long as the 
you that is seen at the bottom of the self is thought of as the self. Only when 
I am I in virtue of the you I harbor at my depths do I recover an infinite 
responsibility at the bottom of my existence itself” (p. 85).
16 Ueda 1991, p. 67.
17 Heisig refers us to an article in which he compares Nishida’s ideas with Buber’s I and 
Thou, criticizes the former from the perspective of the latter, and takes issue with Ueda’s com­
parison of these thinkers (cf. p. 301). See Heisig 2000, pp. 179-207.
18 Nishida does, in fact, comment at length on Kierkegaard’s thought of “the self grounding 
itself in the absolute” in a later text. See Nishida 1979, vol. 10, p. 7ff.
And yet Heisig, while not neglecting to point out these passages, remains 
unconvinced. The no-self is said by Nishida to “give more fully to the other 
because it is grounded in a nothingness rather than in being.” But, Heisig 
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complains, “no other criteria are given forjudging this self-giving.” He then 
tersely adds: “It remains locked up within the self’s ascent to self-aware­
ness” (p. 85). But who, we might ask, is the self that ascends, and what is the 
nature of the self that becomes aware? Is the self that is on the way to aware­
ness the self that must be negated, or is it already the same as the self that 
becomes aware? Does this critical conclusion forget, in the end, to carefully 
differentiate these terms; does it collapse self-awareness back into self-con­
sciousness and no-self back into subjectivity? Does it abandon the Kyoto 
school’s attempt to radically rethink the self-other relation or, only after hav­
ing followed it through to the end, declare it a failure? I leave these questions 
open; for the powerful critique that Heisig has put forward calls for a more 
careful and studied response than can be given here.19
19 One must also think through the ramifications of concluding with Heisig that Nishida’s 
philosophy does not accommodate a genuine ethical relation to the other. Given this alleged 
lacuna at the very heart of Nishida’s thought, could one still claim that his political texts were, 
in fact, a mere aberration from “the fundamental inspirations of his philosophy” (p. 99)? Is it 
enough to say that “one should not expect much in the way of insight on problems of. . . 
morality from Nishida” (p. 71), or should one not demand from any candidate for world phi­
losophy that it allow for a genuine ethical relation to the other?
Against Reading Nishida in Stages
In order to take up this question of self-awareness that Heisig has put for­
ward, it will be necessary among other things for one to carefully trace the 
alterations this term undergoes in the course of the development of Nishida’s 
thought. Heisig himself only does this up to a certain point when he writes: 
“The use of the term ‘self-awareness’ to point to something distinct from 
what western philosophy calls ‘self-consciousness’ only gradually came to 
force in Nishida’s writings,” namely during the course of his increasingly 
explicit and radical attempt to “deabsolutize the ordinary subjectivity of the 
ego” (pp. 49-50). The later Nishida did criticize his own early philosophy as 
not clearly enough breaking free of psychologism and perhaps, by im­
plication, solipsism. In a sense, Heisig carries forth this self-critique into 
Nishida’s later writings as well, asking whether the “immanent transcen­
dence” to the locus of absolute nothingness does not itself remain bound to a 
kind of self-centered worldview that does not leave room for a genuine 
encounter with the Other.
And yet, many interpreters read the “I and You” essay to in fact constitute 
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a major advance, if not a break or a turn, in the development of Nishida’s 
thought. Nishida, having worked out his most “idealistic” writings which 
purport to establish a “system of self-awareness” in The Self-Aware System 
of Universals and The Self-Aware Determination of Nothingness, in the 
essay “I and You,” which appears near the end of the latter volume, striking­
ly claims: “There is no universal whatsoever that subsumes the I and the 
you.”20 In this essay, Nishida argues that the locus of absolute nothingness— 
sometimes called the “highest universal” but differing from the “universals 
of being” in that it alone fully negates itself in so as to let the true individual 
be—must be thought to also let a genuine interpersonal encounter take place. 
Although one may dispute the ultimate success of this attempt to account for 
genuine individuality and personal encounter in a philosophy that still speaks 
in terms of a “system of universals,” it would seem that this essay marks a 
significant new development in Nishida’s thought. It is as if he were testing 
the ability of his current articulations of a philosophy of nothingness to ac­
count for an encounter with the radical otherness of the Other.
20 Nishida 1979, Vol. 6, p. 381.
21 Heisig also does not view as highly significant the subsequent addition of “the third per­
son” (IS), even though this is often taken to be the next important step in Nishida’s develop­
ment (cf. p. 301). Restricting the interpersonal relation to the “I and you” runs the risk, 
according to Nishida, of simply expanding the subjectivity of the I to the familiar realm of 
one’s own community (Gemeinscha.fi). Only by opening oneself in the depths of one’s being 
to the “third person” who is not present, can one introduce an element of “objectivity.” This 
would certainly appear to be an important development in Nishida’s thought with respect to 
the (not always successful) attempts of the Kyoto school to situate Japan in the objective light 
of the “world” during the military rise of the community of the “family-state.”
Yet Heisig, unconvinced, unambiguously judges that this essay “remains 
more of an application of his thinking than an advance of it” (p. 80).21 In fact, 
Heisig does not recognize any major alteration in the fundamentals of 
Nishida’s mature thought. After explicating the development of thought in 
Nishida’s first two books, An Inquiry into the Good and Intuition and Re­
flection in Self-Awareness, and just before beginning the section entitled 
“Self-Awareness,” Heisig writes: “At this point it is best if we focus on the 
most important ideas of Nishida’s mature thought, without paying too much 
attention to their dating or the development of their interlocking” (p. 49). On 
the one hand, Heisig restricts the importance of Nishida’s maiden work to 
“the context of the study of the development of Nishida’s thought and the 
influence it had on others,” judging that, on its own, it “does not walk very 
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far in today’s philosophical world, east or west” (pp. 40-41).22 On the other 
hand, Heisig reads all of Nishida’s middle and later works without distin­
guishing any major alteration or advancement in the core elements of his 
thinking. According to Heisig, Nishida’s thought “goes around in circles, 
ever wider circles, but circles nonetheless” (p. 104). And, unlike the locus of 
absolute nothingness as “a circle with no circumference and no center,” the 
circling of his thought would have its center in a few core ideas, the most 
important of these being, for Heisig, that of self-awareness. This term is thus 
understood as a keyword for all of Nishida’s thought.
22 This negative appraisal of An Inquiry into the Good is likely to arouse some controversy, 
in Japan at least, where there is a tradition of commentary on Nishida, which runs from 
Nishitani to Ueda, that places an enormous importance on the groundbreaking ideas of this 
text. Nishitani writes that Nishida’s later ideas were already “present in germ” in An Inquiry 
into the Good. See Nishitani 1991, pp. 87 and 92. Ueda writes that this maiden work’s notion 
of “pure experience,” while disappearing “like a comet” from the surface of Nishida’s text, is 
in fact the major impetus and problematic that drives the development of his thought. It is 
thus, he adds, like “the beginner’s mind that must not be forgotten” when reading Nishida. 
See Ueda 1998, pp. 33-34.
23 This is, in fact, what many of my own teachers at Otani University and Kyoto University 
tended to do.
This runs directly counter to many interpretations, beginning with that of 
Nishida’s student, Kosaka Masaaki, who saw “self-awareness” as the main 
idea of only one stage of the development of Nishida’s thought (cf. p. 293). 
Heisig agrees with others (Ueda among them) who see “self-awareness” as 
a key term that remains in his thought to the end, and which, therefore, can­
not be confined to one stage. Nishida, to be sure, does continue to use the 
term “self-awareness” to the end of his career, though he also continues to 
define and redefine it along with a number of other key terms (“locus,” 
“intuition,” and “God” among them) each time his thought attempts to apply 
or modify (that is the question!) itself with respect to a new theme. It may be 
the case that it is necessary to distinguish the concept of “self-awareness” 
articulated in the second stage of his thought from the “self-awareness” that 
continues to develop as a key term throughout the later stages.23
Heisig, however, would likely refuse this compromise, as he explicitly 
rejects the idea that Nishida’s mature thought undergoes any modifications 
major enough to divide its development into stages: “There are no great turn­
ing-points or ruptures, and this gives a kind of artificiality to attempts to dis­
tinguish ‘stages’ in Nishida’s thought” (p. 104). This refusal to read Nishida 
in stages marks a major interpretive gesture on Heisig’s part, one that is both 
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powerful and controversial. It is powerful not only in that it allows us to 
seamlessly weave many of Nishida’s texts together and freely use one to elu­
cidate another, but also because it sets before us, in clear connection, the few 
major insights and assumptions from which the many facets of his philoso­
phy draw their life-breath. It is controversial in that what we may lose is 
something of the life-breathing of Nishida’s philosophizing, that is to say, 
the movement of self-questioning that impelled this solitary thinker to con­
tinually search after new “ore,” writing one book after another up until al­
most literally the moment of his death.
The question is whether or not an intentional lack of attention to the order 
of appearance of Nishida’s ideas risks distorting the developmental and log­
ical connection between these ideas. According to Kosaka Kunitsugu, who 
gives us one of the clearest presentations of the stages in the development of 
Nishida’s thought,24 the key ideas appear in the following sequence: 1. pure 
experience; 2. self-awareness; 3. absolute free will; 4. absolute nothingness 
and the logic of locus; 5. the system of universals; 6. the historical dialecti­
cal world; 7. active intuition; 8. the identity of absolute contradictories; and 
9. radical everydayness25 and inverse correspondence. Heisig treats these 
roughly in the order of 1, 2, 3, 7, 4, 8, 6, 4, 5, and 9. While it is certainly the 
case that there is much overlap between these stages and that many of these 
expressions remain central to Nishida’s thought to the end, I found the early 
appearance of “active intuition” and the late appearance of “the logic of 
locus”26 in Heisig’s presentation to be somewhat puzzling. What may prove 
24 See Kosaka 1994, pp. 83-173 and 321-342.
25 Here, I borrow Rolf Elberfeld’s felicitous translation of as “radikale
Alltaglichkeit.” Heisig does not treat this idea in his book. In fact, he treats the idea of 
“inverse correspondence between the self and God” only briefly at the end of his chapter on 
Nishida. There, he notes that the idea speaks against a straightforward mystical unity with 
God, expressing rather the fact that “the more one is an individual the more one is confronted 
with the transcendent” (p.103). But does Heisig consider the full weight of this idea of 
“confrontation” when he had already concluded, a couple of pages prior to this, that: “Like 
the I-you, the relation to God is subservient to the ascent of the individual to true self-aware­
ness . . . God is a function of human interiority” (p. 101)? In reducing the thought of inverse 
correspondence—which is an expression, I would maintain, of Nishida’s increasing attention 
to human fmitude—to another aspect of this “philosophy of self-awareness,” does Heisig pass 
over the major shift in development in Nishida’s religious philosophy, away from early 
notions like “the unity of man and God” (ft An—)?
26 Heisig’s comments on the western sources of inspiration for Nishida’s idea of “locus” 
(see p. 299) need to be supplemented and revised in light of the detailed research that Agustin 
Jacinto Zavala has done in this regard. See Zavala 2001, pp. 119-134.
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to be unexpectedly perplexing to readers is precisely the fact that he does 
manage to introduce these ideas in a lucid logical sequence. In contrast to the 
numerous places where the sense Heisig “has made” (cf. p. x) does indeed 
give us fresh and convincing new ways to interpret the Kyoto school, one 
accustomed to reading Nishida’s texts strictly “in order” may find it disori­
enting when one idea is shown to lead directly to, or derive directly from, 
another idea that, in fact, appeared a decade earlier or a decade later. While 
some novice and advanced readers may indeed find the interpretive circling 
made possible by this chronological bracketing illuminating, it is likely to 
frustrate those dying to get a handle on the movement and development of 
Nishida’s thought. In any case, all of us will need to take into consideration 
Heisig’s challenge to the customaiy step by step way of reading Nishida.
Having ended my reflections with a critical look at the order in which 
Heisig presents Nishida’s ideas and at his criticism of the place—or rather 
lack of one—for an encounter with the interpersonal (or divine) Other in a 
philosophy of self-awareness, let me emphasize again that my intention here 
is to open up these issues for further discussion. It also needs to be stressed— 
and this is one of the most refreshing and important characteristics of the 
book—that Heisig himself has taken great pains to encourage such further 
discussion and debate by providing us with extensive documentation and ref­
erences to contraiy viewpoints, and by citing not only the passages that 
directly support his conclusions but also those in spite of which he makes his 
arguments. This intellectual integrity is demonstrated by the fact that I have 
been able to question certain of his conclusions largely on the basis of other 
passages and quotations that his text itself generously provides. Among this 
book’s many gifts, the greatest may be the model it offers of careful explica­
tion, clear interpretation, and open-minded debate over the issues, that is, 
over the insights and problems that together we inherit from these prolific 
philosophers of nothingness.
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